The “Empty-Shell” Approach: The Setup Process of International Administrations in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, Its Consequences and Lessons by Lemay-Hebert, Nicolas
 
 
The “Empty-Shell” Approach: The Setup Process of
International Administrations in Timor-Leste and




Citation for published version (Harvard):
Lemay-Hebert, N 2011, 'The “Empty-Shell” Approach: The Setup Process of International Administrations in
Timor-Leste and Kosovo, Its Consequences and Lessons', International Studies Perspectives, vol. 12, no. 2, pp.
190-211. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00427.x
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
 
 International Development Department 
 
Lemay-Hebert, N.  
(2011)  
The “Empty-Shell” Approach: The Setup Process of International Administrations 
in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, Its Consequences and Lessons.  
 
Published in  




  This is the author’s post-print 
  The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com 












    
 1	  
THE “EMPTY-SHELL” APPROACH:  
THE SET UP PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS IN 
TIMOR-LESTE AND KOSOVO, ITS CONSEQUENCES AND LESSONS 
 
 
Abstract: State-building under the aegis of international administrations has 
faced various hurdles and obstacles in Kosovo and Timor-Leste—failures that 
came to full light in March 2004 in Kosovo and in May 2006 in Timor-Leste. 
However, the international conception buttressing the set up of international 
administrations—I dub it the “empty shell” approach—is still present in certain 
policy circles. This article aims to analyze this international conception by 
clarifying how the UN came to impose its authority over the two territories in a 
very similar process. While the literature on each state-building experiment is 
vast and compelling, few authors have attempted to contrast the two case studies, 
especially regarding the mental conception informing the governance process of 
these territories since 1999. This article links the empty shell approach with the 
delegitimization process that came to be experienced by the UN in both cases. The 
article describes the international policies put in place by the UN to expand its 
control over the two territories, a mix of cooption of local elites and the 
marginalization of the local population. Finally, the article reveals some possible 
solutions in order to avoid the more blatant difficulties pertaining to state-
building conducted from the outside-in. 
 























Ten years have passed since the United Nations and the international community 
proceeded to set up international administrations in Kosovo and Timor-Leste: the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission for Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). In the aftermaths of these 
experiences, Kosovo is still under international tutelage and Timor-Leste saw a relapse 
into fragility in 2006, four years after the handover of crucial governmental functions to 
local authorities, which brought the UN back inside the country to perform executive 
policing functions. Moreover, from an economic perspective, these two countries are both 
in utter shambles. As it was made clear by Ad Melkert, assistant UN Secretary General 
and associate administrator of the UN Development Program, after a visit to Kosovo in 
2007, “the situation in Kosovo can be compared to the circumstances in the poorest 
African countries: an extremely high mortality rate of newborn children (35 deaths to 
1,000 births), a very high unemployment rate (42 percent), a poor educational system and 
a severely polluted environment” (Melkert 2007). It is an assessment that can be applied 
in general terms to Timor-Leste as well, where unemployment figures are believed to run 
as high as 80 percent, where the Human Poverty level is in decline and where almost half 
the population declared they did not have enough food to eat prior to the closure of the 
UN administration in 2002 (Elrich 2000; Fointuna 2002; Reuters 2002). Furthermore, the 
economic growth reported in Timor-Leste and Kosovo following the 1999 intervention 
was largely driven by the infusion of spending by UN personnel. As noted by Major 
General Raul Cunha, Chief Military Liaison Officer of UNMIK, “the European Union 
has spent in Kosovo 4,000 million euros, in different ways. From those 4,000 millions, 80 
percent was spent in capacity building and consultancy, which means that 3,200 millions 
went back to the base (…) that base has been made by 2 or 3 countries” 
(ObservatorioBalcani e Caucaso 2008). According to Simon Chesterman, only around 
one-tenth of the UNTAET’s budget actually reached the East Timorese (Chesterman 
2007, p. 192). All of these issues have not only added to the lack of accountability of 
international officials and to the perceived foot-dragging regarding the transfer of 
competencies to local actors, but also have fuelled unprecedented resistance by local 
actors to the UN state-building agenda.   
 
However, despite the political, economic, and social hurdles encountered in 
Kosovo and Timor-Leste, described by Vieira de Mello as a “perfect petri-dish for the 
UN” (Power 2008, p. 303) at the outset of the intervention, the idea of direct governance 
of war-torn or “dysfunctional” societies by an outside organization has retained a vast 
influence on certain segments of Academia and policy circles.i While the Brahimi report 
cast a dark shadow over tenants of international administration in 2000,ii there are still 
    
 3	  
pundits pleading the case for new international administrations to be deployed in post-
conflict contexts in order to exercise direct governance on behalf of the local population 
(Weiner 2003; Poppen 2005; Ward 2006). In that regard, and despite the vast literature 
existing on the subject, there is a further need to clarify and revisit the experiences of 
these two international administrations, if only to better understand why the international 
community pushed for such a solution. As the King’s College review of peace operations 
also notes, the UN’s role in Kosovo and Timor-Leste “may have to be reassessed” 
(Conflict Security and Development Group 2003, para. 53). Mats Berdal and Richard 
Caplan also note that “‘technical-administrative’ dimension of international 
administrations has already been explored at great length, whereas comparatively less 
attention has been given to the political challenges involved (italics in the text)” (2004, 
pp. 2-3). 
 
In this context, this paper will try to demystify the state-building experiences of 
Kosovo and Timor-Leste by specifically focusing on the particular relationship that was 
established over time between the international authority and the local actors. The 
process that led to the establishment of nearly identical international administrations in 
Kosovo and in Timor-Leste has to be analyzed in detail, as the process could shed light 
on the current state-building efforts by the international community in other fragile states. 
I will try to clarify the set up process of international administration by focusing on the 
concept of empty shell that came to represent the mental image practitioners shared 
concerning the local context following the two conflicts. Subsequently, the paper will 
analyze how the empty shell approach materialized itself in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, 
notably by a policy of co-optation of certain political elites and the marginalization of the 
local population.  
 
The legitimacy gap under international administration in Kosovo and Timor-Leste 
Two human-made catastrophes of gigantic proportions happened in 1999, only 
months apart,iii eliciting a similar, if not practically identical, response by the 
international community at that time. However, everything seemed to differentiate these 
two territories: Timor-Leste and Kosovo. Timor-Leste and Kosovo are geographically 
separated by nearly 10,000 kilometers and could not be more culturally distinct. Timor-
Leste’s local context presented, for the most part, an ethnically and religiously 
homogenous society, unified behind their leader, Xanana Gusmao, and the political 
umbrella that carried the cause of independence during the last part of Indonesia’s 
occupation (CNRT—National Council of Timorese Resistance), whereas Kosovo’s local 
setting was drastically different, its society being deeply divided over ethnical, 
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religious,and linguistic lines. Furthermore, the local Kosovar-Albanian leadership was 
divided between a pacifist political party led by Ibrahim Rugova, which assured a certain 
degree of health and education services in the Albanian language when Serbia’s 
Milošević drastically restricted these services in the 1980s and 1990s, and Hashim 
Thaci’s Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which proclaimed itself the victor of the 
liberation war against the armed and paramilitary forces of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY). Both parties established their own institutional apparatus following 
FRY’s withdrawal of Kosovo, as did Belgrade in the Northern part of Kosovo. 
Furthermore, in Kosovo, the final status of the territory was not clear from the outset, and 
there was intense international wrangling over the fate of the territory, led notably by 
Serbia but also by Serbia’s traditional political ally and permanent Security Council 
member, Russia. In Timor-Leste, Security Council politics were not impeding the work 
of the international administration nor was the final status of the territory, which was 
clarified from the outset by an internationally-recognized referendum. Moreover, the 
former occupying power, Indonesia, recognized the referendum’s result, even if its armed 
forces and associated militias proceeded to punish the Timorese population for rejecting 
its proposal of autonomy.  
 
Notwithstanding these differences, the United Nations Security Council 
established a full-fledged international administration encompassing executive, 
legislative,and judicial powers over both territories. In these two cases, the international 
apparatus was headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who 
acted as the legal head of state of these territories, enjoying “virtually unlimited powers” 
in the process (Mertus 2001, p. 28; Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
2000, p. 259). The SRSG in Timor-Leste, Sergio Vieira de Mello, described his job as 
amounting to “benevolent despotism” (Vieira de Mello 2000, p. 4). Both missions 
affirmed their respective authority by enacting a nearly identical decree, stating that “all 
legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo [Timor-Leste], including the 
administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK [UNTAET] and is exercised by the 
SRSG [Transitional administrator].” The similarities between the two international 
administrations were no coincidence. As noted by Samantha Power, “lacking familiarity 
with Timor itself, UN officials in New York took the plans they had developed for the 
Kosovo administration and virtually transposed them onto East Timor. (…) UN staff who 
felt sidelined joked that SCR 1272 was a ‘delete Kosovo, insert East Timor’ resolution” 
(Power 2008, p.300). As a participant to the East Timor planning team recalled, “the 
marching orders of the East Timor planning team were in short to ‘take the Kosovo plan 
and reconfigure it to fit East Timor’” (Surkhe 2001b, p. 7). Lakhdar Brahimi, when 
approached to become head of the international administration in Kosovo and then a few 
months after in Timor-Leste, declined in both cases and made a telling comment: “I know 
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nothing about either Kosovo or Timor, but the one thing I am absolutely certain of is that 
they are not the same place” (Power 2008, pp. 300-301). 
 
Deprived of a peaceful and democratic outlet within the system, opposition grew 
outside the system in order to express its complaints. The international administration’s 
neglect of local social processes and sources of legitimacy led certain local actors to 
redeploy strategies to confront the UN international administration and tap into the 
popular wave of discontent among the local population. This is a process that is coherent 
with the “legitimacy approach” to state-building as defined in an earlier article (Lemay-
Hébert 2009a). The fact that these international administrations are “exercising the 
sovereign prerogatives of a state” and “functioning exactly like a government” (Blair 
2002, pp. 10-40) has had specific repercussions on the legitimacy of the interventions. 
Placed in the situation of a de facto government of Kosovo and Timor-Leste, the 
international administrations had to face the same requirements that any legitimate 
government has. If political legitimacy is “in the first place a belief, stated or implied, in 
the right of government to form policies”(Barker 1990, p. 28), or “the extent to which 
people consent to and even support the framework of rules within which political 
institutions function, either because the political institutions are seen as having gained 
authority through some legitimate process, and/or because they are seen to represent 
ideas or values widely supported” (Kaldor2000, p. 285), then the international 
administration will have to convince the local population of the legitimate character of its 
rule. In that regard, they have mostly failed in Kosovo and in Timor-Leste. 
 
The delegitimization process pertaining to the exercise of authority by 
international administration is well-documented in Kosovo. Indeed, thanks to the Early 
Warning System conducted by USAID and UNDP, one cannot fail to notice the failure of 
UNMIK to secure popular legitimacy among Kosovars from all communities. From the 
highpoint of 63.8 percent satisfaction with UNMIK’s performance during the period of 
September–October 2002, UNMIK’sratings have steadily decreased to 20.7 percent 
between January and April 2004 and now stand at 23 percent according to the latest polls 
(UNDP and UNSAID 2009, p. 1). Indeed, if the international military campaign rode on a 
wave of popular sentiment (King and Mason 2006, p. 79) and if during the initial months 
of the intervention UNMIK was able to justify and legitimize its presence to a certain 
extent, with its honeymoon over, UNMIK had a hard time convincing the local 
population of the legitimate character of its rule and administration. In the words of 
Anthony Welch, Coordinator of the International Security Sector Review for Kosovo, 
UNMIK simply failed to command the respect of the local population (Welch 2006, p. 
225). As noted by Lesley Abdela, OSCE deputy director for democratization building in 
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Kosovo, “by the time I left Kosovo in December 1999, UNMIK had squandered its 
honeymoon period (…). By mid-October, it had become clear that the international 
community was fast loosing credibility” (2003, p. 209). The international administration 
quickly became the target of criticism across all communities in Kosovo. Hansjörg 
Strohmeyer, who played a prominent role in the UNMIK architecture, recalls the 
progression of the Albanian sentiment with a simple sentence,“just before the UN moved 
in, the Albanians were forced to give the three-finger Serb salute. When the UN arrived, 
they gave us the peace sign. And then after we’d been there a week, they gave us the 
middle finger” (Power 2008, p. 280). 
 
It is harder to get an accurate picture of the delegitimization process in Timor-
Leste, mainly because the Early Warning System was not reproduced in this country. 
However, accounts of the delegitimization process are abundant. Not unlike Kosovo, it is 
generally recognized that initially the local population openly welcomed the UN (Chopra 
2000, p. 28; Dunn 2003, p. 367; Martin and Mayer-Rieckh 2005, p. 136), and similarly, 
the dissatisfaction with the international presence appeared early on in the process of 
administering the country. As noted by the former UNTAET official Anthony Goldstone, 
“by April 2000, six months into the mission, voices in the East Timorese leadership were 
calling for the UN’s prompt withdrawal, and by early 2001 a consensus seemed to be 
forming that the relationship was not a healthy one and should be terminated as soon as 
possible” (Goldstone 2004, p. 88). Indeed, in March 2000, there were already calls within 
the CNRT for civil disobedience against the UN and talk of declaring unilateral 
independence from what was dubbed “another group of invaders” (Joly 2000). In May of 
the same year, the UN-appointed minister of Foreign Affairs, Jose Ramos-Horta, in a 
meeting with Annan, asked for the removal of all district administrators by August and 
their replacement with local leaders, as well as a fixed date for the UN’s departure. He 
notably said in a public statement, “I told the Secretary-General there is a growing level 
of frustration and disillusionment with the UN in East Timor, particularly among the 
young” (Riley 2000b; Corcoran 2000) James Dunn reported “considerable discontent and 
criticism” among local population directed towards UNTAET in October 2000 (Dunn 
2000), while members of the National Council, an organization created in July 2000 to 
advise the Transitional administrator,iv clearly stated in the middle of the “Timorization” 
process that “the UN transitional phase had been going on for too long, was neither 
efficient nor popular, and should be terminated quickly” (Dodd 2000e). In 2001, some of 
the violence was turned directlyagainst the UN. For instance, when Portuguese riot police 
roughed up a Dili taxi driver in February 2001, a crowd quickly gathered to pelt the 
police with stones, and only dispersed when shots were fired in the air (Murphy 2001). In 
March, a mob surrounded and stoned Jordanian peacekeepers in Baucau, the second 
biggest city in Timor-Leste (Suara Timor Lorosae 2001). 
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The empty-shell approach: Picturing the local context as a tabula rasa 
The unprecedented powers devoted to the world organization in Kosovo and in 
Timor-Leste were directly related to the perception of these war-torn territories following 
the dramatic events in 1999. The state of the material and institutional destruction in 
Kosovov and in Timor-Lestevi led commentators and experts at the UN and elsewhere to 
see the political situation in these countries figuratively as a black hole. As the UN 
official Hansjbörg Strohmeyer noted in an interview to James Traub, “UN officials in 
Kosovo used to refer to the bombed-out territory they administered as the ‘empty shell’” 
(Traub 2000, p. 74). He explained the meaning of the expression elsewhere, stating that 
“one of the consequences of the violence was that practically overnight, both territories 
were stripped of their entire administrative and executive super-structures. (…) It was in 
this situation that the ‘empty shell’ metaphor later used so often to describe Kosovo and 
East Timor obtained its meaning” (Strohmeyer 2001b, p. 109). It was also a phrasing 
used by Kofi Annan himself to legitimize the UN’s role in Timor-Leste (Crossette 1999). 
Along the same line, Simon Chesterman, like others, remarked that many of the 
expatriates working for the UN and non-governmental organizations tended to treat the 
political system as a tabula rasa or tera nullius (Chesterman 2001, p. 26; Surkhe 2001b, 
p. 13). Hence, the common view at the time was that the challenge of these missions 
could be described as taking these territories “from virtually nothing to practically 
everything in the next few years” (Priest and Graham 1999), given that these territories 
have “to be invented from scratch” (ABC 1999).  
 
One could argue, along with Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac, that the 
notion of failed states, and a fortiori the notion of empty shell, “fixes culpability for war 
on the societies in question, rendering the domestic populations dysfunctional while 
casting international rescue interventions as functional”(Hughes and Pupavac 2005, p. 
873). As Jarat Chopra astutely observes, “perceptions of a power vacuum (…) have 
drawn the world community in an ever more intensive role in the exercise of transitional 
political authority. (…) The project [global governorship] assumed a state-centric terra 
nullius and an open season on institutional invention” (2002, pp. 979-981). Thus, it 
served additionally as a convenient legitimization basis for the setting up of international 
administrations in these territories. Indeed, one of the assumptions made by advocates of 
direct international administrations was that the extent of destruction on the ground 
required the international community to take charge of the process of governance. Once 
the reconstruction process began to take hold, the international community would start a 
progressive withdrawal from the territory as the state infrastructure grew firmer and 
stronger. If there was “nearly nothing” in these countries for the UN to build on, as 
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Sergio Vieira de Mello posited, then, in his own words, “nearly everything had to be 
brought in” (UN 2000e; Surkhe 2001b, p. 14), which was an argument shared by certain 
academics. As Jürgen Friedrich states, “the justice system and the executive had to be 
completely restarted and changed. In other words, the objectives could not be pursued in 
practice without possessing full governmental powers (italics added)” (2005, pp. 241-
242). However, as asserted by Chopra, this approach “missed the fact that population 
continues to exist, that market forces of whatever kind are always at work, and that the 
social structures of indigenous communities invariably generate sources of political 
legitimacy according to their own paradigm” (2002, p. 980). 
 
When looking more closely at the debate surrounding the international 
interventions in 1999, it is clear that this particular institutional focus—which leads to a 
neglect of other social structures—actually appeared months before the adoption of the 
Security Council Resolutions on establishing the international administrations. For 
instance, as expressed by the International Crisis Group one month before the adoption of 
Resolution 1244, there was a general feeling that “conditions in Kosovo are right for a 
protectorate-style model of administration” (ICG 1999a, p. ii). The research group 
continues, stating that “given the scope of depopulation and destruction, and the difficulty 
of identifying local interlocutors who are neither too weak (Rugova) nor potentially too 
strong (Kosovo Liberation Army leaders), this may be the ideal time to try the 
Protectorate or Mandate model” (ICG 1999a, p. 21). The International Crisis Group 
stated more bluntly in a later report that “the role of the international administration will 
be to govern the country, in the absence of indigenous authorities, while at the same time 
developing indigenous structures which will in due course be capable of providing self-
government (italics added)” (ICG 1999b, p. 2). 
 
In the specific mention of the “absence of indigenous authorities” resides the main 
legitimizing criterion for the international administrations in Kosovo and Timor-Leste. 
Although this point of view was generally consensual, certain organizations thought to 
dissent. For instance, the World Bank’s Joint Assessment Mission reported that 20–
25percent of the civil servants had left Timor-Leste in the aftermath of the elections, 
which, from a strictly administrative standpoint, presented a slightly different assessment 
of the situation on the ground than the tenants of the empty shell perspective (World 
Bank 1999, para. 15). The fact that the World Bank was using Timorese to conduct its 
Assessment Mission was in itself a rebuttal of the empty shell perspective (Surkhe 2001b, 
p. 16). Furthermore, the UNDP stated clearly in 1999 that “East Timor should not be 
considered terra nullis insofar as the emerging UN Administration is concerned” (UNDP 
1999, p. 5). The authors of the report argue that “this entails adopting a very cautious 
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attitude to applying any ‘state of the art’ type systems and facilities, as these will simply 
break down in the absence of significant foreign capital and skills input.” Furthermore, 
forecasting the local resistance and contestation that will take place, the authors remark 
“for the people of East Timor there is not likely to be endless patience for yet another 
foreign administrative class managing their affairs. This should be seen against the 
background that this would be the fourth such group in the past 60 years. This suggests 
most strongly that the UN Administration’s prime objective in East Timor must be 
to make itself redundant as soon as possible (emphasis in the text)” (UNDP 1999, p. 
6). The UNDP report never got a hearing, according to AstriSurkhe (Surkhe 2001b, p. 
16). 
 
Actually, in both Kosovo and Timor-Leste, social institutions were still present 
and active despite the level of institutional destruction. In Kosovo, the Republic of 
Kosova, which existed since October 1991 under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, was 
carrying out basic governmental duties such as education and health care in the shadow 
of Serbia’s authoritative rule over the territory. The parallel institutions were, if not 
dismantled, at least strongly weakened by Milošević’s heavy-handed policies following 
NATO’s intervention. However, the social fabric of the Kosovar society was brought 
back together with the rapid return of the refugees from neighboring countries in 1999 
and early 2000. In the case of Kosovo, the restrictive institutional approach led the 
international administration to adopt top-down policies, sometimes unnecessarily 
reinventing the wheel where it could have tapped into the existing local expertise. 
However, this article will focus specifically on Timor-Leste’s traditional structures, 
which predated and actually outlived the Indonesian’s rule, which is a major social 
reference for the Timorese, organizing and influencing their daily life like no other social 
structures.  
 
The limits of the empty shell approach: the difficulties of creating from scratch a 
system of justice in Timor-Leste 
Hansjörg Strohmeyer, who was the acting principal legal adviser to the 
transitional administrator in Timor-Leste, noted how hard it was to build a system of 
justice when not “a single lawyer” was present in Timor-Leste (Strohmeyer 2001b, p. 
114). He also saw his tasks as “a complete re-creation of the judiciary” and asks aloud the 
question “how can a justice system be administered when there is no system left to be 
administered?” (Strohmeyer 2001a, pp. 47-48) This “ground zero” approach, as 
Strohmeyer dubbed it, was also shared by certain academics or by the media (Chesterman 
2002, p. 6; Kaminski 1999). 
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One of the first acts of the Transitional Administrator was to create a Transitional 
Judicial Service Commission, composed of three Timorese and two international experts. 
Its primary function was to recommend to the Transitional Administrator candidates for 
provisional judicial or prosecutorial offices. At the same time, the International Force in 
East Timor (INTERFET) volunteered to drop leaflets from airplanes throughout the 
territory, calling for legally qualified East Timorese to contact any UNTAET or 
INTERFET office or outpost (Strohmeyer 2001a, p. 54). It took more than a year for the 
UN to officially acknowledge the presence of the local systems of justice,vii although it 
appears that there was some amount of knowledge of the traditional system among 
officers in the political affairs or national security departments, as well as the Civpol or 
the Office of the Principal Legal Adviser (Mearns 2001, p. 6). What is believed to be the 
first report emanating from UNTAET that included references to the local systems of 
justice concluded that international police officials were acting pragmatically at the 
village level by encouraging some (often most) situations to be resolved through the 
village chief and a village council, conceding that the local justice system was operating 
and appeared to be the preferred system in many cases. Furthermore, both local people 
and international police officials recognized that the formal system of law was and will 
remain too remote, too expensive and too slow to resolve disputes at the local level 
(Mearns 2001, p. 7; Kerr and Mobekk 2007, p. 151). This was also the conclusion of the 
Report on the National Constitutional Consultation in East Timor, which noted around 
the same time a strong desire of the people to retain the system of traditional justice at the 
local level to overcome the problems caused by local disputes and crimes (Mearns 2001, 
p. 6). 
 
Initially, UNTAET tried to build from scratch a Western model of governance. In 
that regard, the UN simply followed the global trend in post-conflict reconstruction—
where 80 percent of the worldwide development assistance in the area of justice goes to 
the development of an institutional justice sector, while traditional and customary 
systems resolve around 90 percent of the conflicts (UNDP 2004, pp. 8-9). Early on, 
UNTAET officials declared that “judicial authority in East Timor shall be exclusively 
vested in courts that are established by law and composed of judges who are appointed to 
these courts” (UN 2000c, section 1). In this Regulation, the UN made no mention of local 
systems of justice. However, the UN’s attempt to build a Westernized system of justice 
never gained any legitimacy in the eyes of the population. As Tanja Hohe and Rod Nixon 
state: 
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There was not even tension between the two systems—as they both operated in 
different universes. The international community never paid attention to the 
nature and relevance of local systems in the determination of strategies. It was 
taken for granted that new systems would be readily accepted by societies, 
though they do not match with local concepts and despite the negative 
experiences with the former Indonesian justice sector (2003, p. 2). 
 
 
Hence, in a report mandated by the World Bank and UNTAET, Sofi Ospina and Tanja 
Hohe noted that despite the overt attempt to engineer a new local democratic basis for 
social development, customary leaders and the elders of the villages still retained 
considerable authority and influence (Ospina and Hohe 2001, pp. 8-9). Furthermore, a 
survey conducted in 2003 indicated an overwhelming support for traditional systems of 
justice: 84 percent considered the local systems as easier to understand than the court 
system, 86 percent considered them cheaper and requiring less traveling, 78 percent 
considered them as contributing more effectively to reconciliation, and 75 percent 
considered the local systems faster and more efficient than the courts (USAID 2004, p. 
55).  
 
In that context, UNTAET was forced to gradually change its position. For 
instance, a couple of months before handing over governmental authority to local 
institutions, UNTAET adopted the Regulation on the “establishment of a commission for 
reception, truth and reconciliation in East Timor,” which allowed the new Commission to 
facilitate “community reconciliation processes” in relation to criminal or noncriminal acts 
committed within the context of the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste, thus more in 
accordance with local traditional structures. In doing so, UNTAET was recognizing a 
process that was already taking place on a local level. However, it proved a belated 
attempt to bring legitimacy to public institutions. The hybrid tribunals, involving 
international and local judges to prosecute serious crimes committed under Indonesian 
rule, were already seriously inefficient. The Public Prosecutor’s Office was so 
underfunded and inexperienced that it did not call a single witness at any of its first 
14trials, leaving David Cohen to ask if “a minimally credible tribunal is better than none” 
(Cohen 2002, p. 1). Furthermore, adding to the legitimacy crisis striking the Westernized 
justice system, in January 2005, all 22 Timorese judges failed their evaluations at the 
conclusion of their probationary period of more than four years, leaving only four 
qualified and certified international judges (Clausen 2005). 
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Taking into account local systems of political, social, and justice is not in itself a 
panacea for all the problems encountered by international administrations. Many reasons 
could be invoked to explain the international neglect of these social structures. In Timor-
Leste, the traditional system of justice was perceived as going against certain basic 
human rights principles, especially concerning women’s rights, whereas in Kosovo, the 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages and political rivalries forced the UN to be 
cautious concerning the local role in governance. However, one could argue that to 
ignore the local mechanisms, such as in Timor-Leste, does not make them disappear. 
 
International strategy in Kosovo and Timor-Leste: between the co-optation of local 
elites and the marginalization of the local population  
Interestingly enough, after the initial deployment phase, Timor-Leste and Kosovo 
went through very similar political developments, even if the local context was 
drastically different in these two cases. While the obligation to consult the local 
population was recognized by the UN in both cases, the UN, nevertheless, chose to 
enforce its authority to an unprecedented degree, showing a “preoccupation with control 
at the expense of the local community’s involvement in government” (Chopra 2000, p. 
30). If the underemphasis of local actors and social processes could be partially explained 
froma technocratic perspective owing tothe importance given to staffing and internal 
management in the first months of these two international experiments (Beauvais 2001, p.  
1106; Caplan 2005, pp. 86-108; Surkhe 2001a), then one could also argue that the 
underemphasis was a specific by-product of the institutional logic and the empty-shell 
perspective, as argued earlier. Furthermore, this perspective caused UNMIK and 
UNTAET officials to rely quasi-exclusively on certain political elites in order to show a 
certain degree of openness toward the local population and to enforce top-down policies, 
which had unexpected effects on the state-building process. 
 
While it was expected that the UN would quickly fill the institutional void during 
the immediate aftermath of the 1999 crises in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, the world 
organization faced stark difficulties in its deployment. The first actor on the ground was 
in both cases the military, NATO in Kosovo and the Australian-led military intervention 
force in Timor-Leste (INTERFET). In Kosovo, General Klaus Reinhardt clearly 
mentioned that the military “ran the country, not the civilian organizations. The military 
were the kings, they [made] it happen” (Zaalberg 2006, p. 443). Similarly, in Timor-
Leste, faced with a “power vacuum frightfully similar to that in Kosovo” (Zaalberg 2006, 
p. 424), INTERFET progressively restored security in all districts, assuming de facto 
responsibility for governance and the rule of law until the UN’s presence could be 
effectively reestablished (Smith and Dee 2003, p. 46). The military intervention in both 
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cases had to create space for the international civilian mission to operate. As the 
INTERFET commander Peter Cosgrove notes, INTERFET had to “get people back [and] 
allow the UN in” (Thompson 2007). This set the stage for a policy of imposing the 
international administration’s authority in Kosovo and in Timor-Leste. 
 
However, international administrators in Kosovo and Timor-Leste had few 
resources at their disposal from the outset. Bernard Kouchner had no more than thirty 
people on the ground when he came into office in Kosovo (Zaalberg 2006, p. 444). One 
year after the establishment of the mission, the UN Civil Administrative Component had 
292 professional personnel deployed, out of its authorized total of 435 (UN 2000d, 
para.28), to implement the general strategy of the Secretary-General for Kosovo, the first 
phase being “establishment and consolidation of UNMIK’s authority and creation of 
UNMIK-managed administrative structures” (UN 1999a). In Timor-Leste, after being 
redeployed from UNMIK, Vieira de Mello only arrived in Dili on November 16, nearly 
two months after the adoption of Resolution 1272. Vieira de Mello admitted that he 
arrived with “a bunch of generalists, people I knew and brought with me, but who had no 
experience with actual government” (Cristalis 2002, p. 266). Much of the staff was from 
Kosovo, an “inner circle from the Balkans, whose members projected a blunt, bullying 
style” (Chopra 2000, p. 33).  
 
The international administration proceeded to extend its authority even if the local 
context in Kosovo and Timor-Leste widely differed. In Kosovo, the attacks by certain 
Kosovo Albanian groups targeting the Serbian community as well as the presence of 
competing parallel institutions, established by the KLA and Rugova, initially forced the 
UN to impose its institutional apparatus over the territory. However, the situation was 
different in Timor-Leste. After the international intervention in 1999 in Timor-Leste, the 
village and suco(cluster of villages) chiefs took part in cooperative efforts with the 
CNRT, the vast political umbrella revered by the Timorese population for its role in the 
resistance against Indonesia. As noted by Ospina and Hohe, “the clandestine and the 
traditional power system met, but it seems that in many ways they did not appear as a 
contradiction” (2001, p. 8). Rod Nixon similarly states that “this organization [CNRT] 
overlapped extensively with local administrative and ritual structures” (2006, p. 93). As 
early as the end of October, the CNRT began to constitute its structures through village 
elections. The CNRT appointed representatives at every level, establishing a de facto 
shadow administration.  
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While the efficiency and legitimacy of the CNRT as a political umbrella was 
recognized from the outset by UNTAET, senior officials at the international 
administration decided to make imposing their authority over the territory a priority. As a 
leaked report from UNTAET in the Ermera district (central) notes that “CNRT 
involvement in distribution of humanitarian assistance is being (sic) extremely important 
due to the fact that the NGOs have been incapable of organising food distribution.” A 
similar report from the Liquiçá district (Northwest) notes that “CNRT have the strong 
support and trust of the majority of the population, and are highly coordinated and 
efficient in their management of programs.” However, both reports recommend that 
UNTAET take over that role: “it is essential that civil affairs quickly develops a stronger 
presence in the district so that UNTAET is seen to be the administrative authority.” The 
reporter also notes that reports from East Timorese and from other districts suggest that 
the approach taken in Ermera and Liquica is a national pattern (King 2000). Furthermore, 
the new administrative staff selected to represent the UN on the sub-national level was 
picked according to their educational background and not on traditional criteria. The 
discrepancy between the “modern” way of selecting staff and the local ideas about 
legitimate leaders in these positions “led local populations to reject the personnel. The 
result was that UNTAET-selected staff lacked local legitimacy” (Hohe 2004, p. 47; 
Knezevic 2005, p. 7) At both the national and local levels, Timorese leaders could have 
been part of the administration from the outset, but UNTAET’s senior leadership decided 
otherwise. 
 
Both in Kosovo and in Timor-Leste, international administrators proceeded to 
expand their authority by co-opting segments of the local political elite. In this regard, the 
cooption is a two-way process, where internationals use certain groups to fulfill their 
state-building agenda, while the international governance of Kosovo is “susceptible to 
local cooption, particularly where one group can adopt the language of the liberal peace 
and has strong support and credibility from the international community” (Franks and 
Richmond, 2008, p. 81). The creation of the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC) by 
Sergio Vieira de Mello during his short stay as SRSG in Kosovo initially brought the 
local actors from various backgrounds around the same table. The Council, with only 
advisory and consultative authority, convened on the first day of Kouchner’s arrival, but 
was plagued by serious logistical problems and eventually lost its usefulness. On  
December 15, 1999, Kouchner used a different approach and brokered an agreement 
between three Kosovo Albanian leaders, Hashim Thaçi of the KLA, Ibrahim Rugova of 
the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and Rexhep Qosja of the United Democratic 
Movement (LBD) that led to the creation of the “representative structures of self-
government in Kosovo,” christened the “Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS)”. 
The objective was to create a “consultative body […] in order to incorporate individuals 
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who participate in parallel structures in the municipal administration” (UN 1999b, para. 
35) In return for inclusion in the structures administering Kosovo, in particular a seat in 
the newly created Interim Administrative Council (IAC), the Kosovar leaders had to give 
up their earlier titles and claims, and dissolve all parallel structures by a deadline of  
January 31, 2000. The IAC was perceived by the population as a de facto executive 
committee for Kosovo. However, the Kosovar members of the IAC frequently 
complained that the “real decisions were made behind their backs and without them being 
consulted” (Brand 2003, p. 19) and similar recriminations were made concerning the 
administrative departments and municipal councils.  
 
Thus, the whole process was quickly understood by Kosovo Albanians as a way 
for UNMIK to enforce its authority over the territory of Kosovo, at least South of the 
Ibarriver, rather than a genuine process of sharing competencies with them. The JIAS 
arrangement represented an effective instrument for the SRSG to dismantle existing 
parallel Kosovar Albanian structures while establishing a control mechanism for UNMIK 
to retrieve effective administrative authority (Narten 2006, p. 147). As noted by Shelley 
Inglis and David Marshall, the latter who acted as Head of the Legal Systems Monitoring 
Section for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo between 2000 and 2001, “despite vocal protest 
from all members of the JAC, regulations were provided to the JAC as a token gesture. 
By the end of 2001, it was clear that what had begun as one of the only high-level forums 
for international and local consultation and cooperation on legal issues had become an 
empty shell” (Marshall and Inglis 2003, p. 118). The authors also note that UNMIK’s 
consultation with local actors on legislative reform and on the legislative reform agenda 
diminished rather than expanded over time. Even after the first municipal elections in 
October 2000, where the JIAS structure began to be replaced by elected Municipal 
Assemblies and Presidents, UNMIK retained all its discretionary powers.viii 
 
The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Government, which created the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in 2001, reproduced the same 
political arrangement, this time at the national level. If it was a major step toward a 
transfer of certain competencies to local institutions, the Framework did not 
fundamentally alterthe architecture of power in Kosovo because UNMIK was still 
holding the keys of power. As the ICG comments, “the powers of the new institutions 
will be limited, and, despite the devolution of responsibility for the day-to-day running of 
affairs in many areas of government, the ultimate powers of the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General are undiminished” (ICG 2001, p. ii). For King and Mason, the 
Constitutional Framework “did not endow its democratically members (sic) with ultimate 
authority in any area” (King and Mason 2006, p. 119) while a high UNMIK official 
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describes the transfer as “administration on behalf of and under the supervision of the 
SRSG” (Höfer-Wissing 2002, p. 11). Following the legislative election of November 17, 
2001—even though the SRSG was under strong pressure from New York to avoid 
interfering in the affairs of the PISG—tensions between UNMIK and the local 
institutions grew and led to public clashes, fuelled by the gap between the “legitimacy [of 
elected bodies] and actual political power” (Brand 2003, p. 52; Knoll 2007, pp. 1-15). 
While UNMIK’s interference was low compared to the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for instance, on several occasions the UN specialrepresentativedeclared an 
Assembly resolution “null and void.” For example, when the Assembly in 2003 and 2004 
tried unilaterally to amend the constitutional framework, UNMIK rejected the proposed 
changes (Tansey 2009, p. 158). 
 
The policy of “Standards before Status” also frustrated domestic actors by 
showing UNMIK its propensity to control the political agenda. Introduced by SRSG 
Michael Steiner in April 2002, the new policy did not change much in Kosovo in terms of 
the power dynamic.ix As Jock Covey, who acted as DSRSG in Kosovo relates, 
“ambiguity about the goals that had to be met and the absence of a working partnership 
with the PISG to attain them created a widespread popular perception that this policy 
should really be called “Standards to Prevent Status’” (Covey 2005, p. 121). Only the 
violent incidents of March 2004,x which saw turbulent Kosovars taking on the ethnic 
minorities and the international presence, forced a radical change in the power dynamic 
in Kosovo: the UN downsizing its mission and presence in the Kosovar political 
landscape. The economic stagnation or the unfulfilled expectations for that matter, 
certainlyplayed a role in the March events, heightening tension between the UN and the 
local population. As Dominik Zaum notes “the UN administration had presided over a 
rapidly deteriorating economy providing thousands of young recruits for an army of 
dispossessed, unemployed and frustrated” (2004). After the events of March 2004, the 
level of satisfaction with UNMIK action was so low that, as King and Mason put it, “if 
UNMIK had been up for election, it would have needed to campaign hard to win votes 
from anybody in Kosovo other than its own staff” (2006, p. 220). The Secretary General 
subsequently dispatched the Norwegian Ambassador Kai Eide to conduct a 
“comprehensive review of the policies and practices of all actors in Kosovo,” which 
would prepare a further report on the “comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo.” 
The first Eide report was clear: there should be an ambitious policy of transfer of 
authority to the institutions of Kosovo, coupled with a restructuring of UNMIK. Eide 
clarified in his second report that, “while standards implementation in Kosovo has been 
uneven, the time has come to move to the next phase of the political process” (UN 
2005).Eide’s report identified the Standards before Status policy as having contributed to 
“a period of political stagnation and widespread frustration”(UN 2005).It has to be noted 
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that while the Eide report argued for the substitution of the Standards before Status policy 
in favor of progressing to focus specifically on Kosovo’s status, it did not suggest that the 
international oversight inherent in the standards process be amended in favour of local 
control. Eide’s prescriptions, in fact, proposed an extended mandate for international 
oversight, albeit in a less direct form, with, as the process’ final goal, a status for Kosovo 
that falls short of full sovereignty. The proposal increased the powers devolved to the 
Kosovo institutions but did not provide for the removal of ultimate international oversight 
and authority. Martti Ahtisaari, as Special Envoy of the Secretary General on Kosovo’s 
future status, extensively built on Eide’s assessment and recommended, after unfruitful 
negotiations between the two parties, “independence, supervised by the international 
community”. How the new international presence, progressively assumed by the 
International Civilian Office, will be perceived remains an open question.  
 
The option of consultation and co-optation of political elites, if it helped to bring a 
certain dose of legitimacy to the international administration especially in the first 
months, was not in itself sufficient. As correctly forecasted by the ICG in 2001, “the 
newly elected officials will be unlikely to accept for long the straightjacket imposed by 
the unelected international administration” (ICG 2001, p. ii). In effect, as the Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo states, “the UN administration retains (…) [what 
amounts to] vice regal powers, appropriate to a colonial dependency, rather than to a self-
governing people” (2001, p. 25). As the author of the report, Justice Richard Goldstone, 
remarks, “the extensive powers accorded the SRSG mean that, instead of the substantial 
self-government promised the Kosovars under Resolution 1244, they will instead get very 
limited autonomy. They will have the illusion of self-rule rather than the reality.” The 
Commission goes on as saying that “a pervasive distrust of the administrative and 
political capacity of the population appears to underlie the constitutional provisions. If 
the population is distrusted, it is likely to repay like with like” (2001, pp. 20-21). 
Underpinning the international approach to Kosovo is, similarly to Timor-Leste, the 
empty-shell approach. As Justice Goldstone states “Kosovo is effectively under colonial 
rule. During my most recent visit to Kosovo, the distrust of the administrative and 
political capacity of the Albanian population was palpable” (2002, p. 145). A UN internal 
document obtained in Pristina clearly stipulates that “Kosovo Albanians, largely excluded 
from public institutions during the decade before 1999, lacked sufficient expertise in 
modern government” (UN 2008, p. 2). Once again in a process that echoes the one 
described earlier in Timor-Leste, it seems that past experience of self-governance was 
largely ignored by the international administration; this time, the experience in 
establishing and keeping afloat parallel structures of governance in the face of blatant 
oppression did not seem to fit the bill for the governance of the territory. The “failure to 
learn about the history of Kosovar society and failure to listen to local leaders and to 
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learn about this history of the Kosovar parallel society has led internationals to overlook 
its potential (…)” (Mertus 2001, p. 30). Good arguments exist for ignoring the parallel 
structures, however, as Julie Mertus notes, “the parallel government did reflect a 
participatory ethos and efforts to build on it would have lent legitimacy and effectiveness 
to the international effort” (2001, p. 30). 
 
In Timor-Leste as well, local elites soon felt marginalized by the UN 
administration. Gusmão explained on November 13,1999, before the arrival of Sergio 
Vieira de Mello, that “we don’t feel very comfortable with some people acting like kings 
of East Timor, coming here to impose their models (…) we are strong enough to expel 
anybody from East Timor” (Norling 1999). The National Consultative Council (NCC), 
created in order to incorporate some of the leaders into the decision-making process, did 
not change much in terms of dynamics on the ground. Since the Security Council had 
authorized only the UN administrator to make law, the NCC had, as its title indicates, 
only consultative powers. As it was supposed to be a “unique means for UNTAET to hear 
and to respond to the needs of the East Timorese and for the latter to participate in 
important policy decisions” (UN 2000a, para. 70), it also became clear that it could be 
transformed into a mere Timorese chamber for legitimizing decisions taken by UNTAET. 
As UNTAET official Peter Galbraith notes, “the Timorese thought they had little choice 
but to ratify whatever was put in front of them. They were essentially told ‘if you don’t 
do this, there’ll be dire consequences with no money to follow” (Steele 2002, p. 79). As 
recalled by Power, Ramos-Horta laughed off the UN’s invitation to join the NCC. “I was 
powerless outside of ET for long enough,” he told de Mello, “the last thing I need is to be 
powerless inside Timor.” As Gusmãorecalled,“we felt we were being used. We realized 
we weren’t there to help the UN make decisions or to prepare ourselves to run the 
administration. We were there to put our rubber stamp on Sergio’s regulations, to allow 
the UN to claim to be consulting” (Power 2008, p. 307). 
 
If from the beginning UNTAET was fond to describe its work as “not so much an 
interim administration as a co-architect, with the East Timorese people, of a national 
administration that would serve long after UNTAET’s departure” (UN 2000b), local 
actors begged to differ. In fact, as James Fox notes, the forms of administration that were 
put into effect closely replicated the Indonesian system (Fox 2001, p. 7). In effect, many 
Timorese felt the centralization process was “a repeat of the way programs were carried 
out by the Indonesian government during the occupation. The local people always felt 
that they were only objects of the reconstruction process rather than actors determining 
reconstruction plans” (Dos Reis 2003). Adding to that, de Mello had not only to face 
growing criticism from the local representatives, but also from his own staff, notably 
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Jarat Chopra, Head of UNTAET’s Office of District Administration. According to 
Chopra, in January 2000, Dili had 174 professional-level staff while only 17 officials had 
been deployed across the 13 regions; when new staff finally arrived, they were “retained 
in Dili to increase the influence of the Transitional Administrator’s inner circle” (Chopra 
2002, p. 988). Not only were they under-resourced, but the District administrators felt 
they lacked concrete authority to make decisions. This led to Jarat Chopra’s resignation 
on March 6, 2000. His decision was out of frustration as he believed that the UN was not 
setting a meaningful timetable for the transfer of power to the Timorese. Chopra claimed 
that “Stalinist” and “colonialist” practices by senior staff members were jeopardizing the 
UN mission (Dodd 2000a; Riley 2000a). Following Chopra’s resignation, no less than 13 
UN district administrators complained in a protest note that “autocratic decision-making 
by a few UN senior officials could threaten the development of democracy in East 
Timor” (Dodd 2000b). Mirroring Chopra’s resignation in March 2000, Pedro Bacelar de 
Vasconcelos, second in command of the Political, Constitutional, and Electoral Affairs 
Department, offered his resignation to Vieira de Mello, also on the ground of “profound 
differences” with senior UN officials. He expressed his discontent with “the Department 
Head’s support for strategies that tend to place the Timorese, or mainly Timorese, 
political structures, created by UNTAET itself, on a secondary level” (Braga 2000).  
 
To his credit, de Mello changed, or at least tried to change, UNTAET’s policy 
inthe spring of 2000. With Timorese unrest boiling over, he sent a half-dozen trusted 
members of his staff on a two-day retreat and asked them to return with proposals for 
overhauling the mission (Power 2008, p. 328). They came up with a system of co-
governance with Timorese officials, an idea that was quite revolutionary for the world 
organization. Thus, Vieira de Mello introduced in July 2000 what would be described as 
the First Transitional Government, comprising a National Council (NC) and a Cabinet, 
together with the office of the Transitional Administrator. While the Cabinet together 
with the office of the Transitional Administrator was meant to compose the executive 
power, the expanded Council, consisting of 33 members and later 36, was to constitute a 
sort of legislative forum, in order to provide a separation of power that Timor-Leste never 
experienced so far. The NC had the competence to initiate, modify, and recommend draft 
regulations as well as to amend existing regulations. The Transitional Administrator 
nevertheless retained final decision making authority. In explaining this change of policy, 
de Mello reportedly said that with a shared government, the UN administration would no 
longer “continue to play the unhappy role of punching bag,” but would instead “share the 
blows” with the East Timorese administrators. This proposal was also backed up with 
other policies, such as recruitment of thousands of Timorese civil servants and 
appointment of Timorese middle-level managers in the new administration. Interestingly 
enough, this change of policy came amid a toning down of the rhetoric about so-called 
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Timorese’s incapacities. Furthermore, the “Timorization” could be seen as “on-the-job 
training for the United Nations itself,” since this was the “first time in United Nations 
history that international staff has worked under local nationals” and some members of 
the international staff were obviously not happy about it (Mydans 2000). 
 
However the local leadership,spearheaded by Gusmão but who was sometimes 
overrode by those he led, continued to denounce UNTAET’s still present centralizing 
tendencies. As reported by The Australian’s journalist, Peter Alford, Timorese leaders 
would not join Vieira de Mello in “the punching bag” mainly because “he still had 
overriding authority in all areas of the administration” (Alford 2000).One might add that 
by punching harder, the local leadership also avoided the responsibilities for any setbacks 
in the Timor-Leste state-building process. Thus, despite early reports by the UN that 
everything went admirably well between internationals and locals (Waran 2000), the 
local leadership took the path of contestation. Gusmão in an October 10, 2000 speech 
concluding the August CNRT congress, made the strongest indictment of the UN mission 
to date. He notably accused the UN of tokenism, adding that he “did not wish to inherit 
the heavy decision-making and project implementation mechanisms in which the role of 
the East Timorese is to give their consent as observers rather than the active players we 
should start to be” (Dodd 2000c). In December 2000, the four Timorese ministers of the 
Cabinet threaten to resign from the interim administration. One minister, João 
Carrascalao, explained the decision in these terms, “the members of the Timorese cabinet 
feel ourselves to be in the situation of second class ministers. We have no working 
conditions, no support staff, and most of the decisions are taken by foreigners who 
repeatedly interfere in the management of our affairs. This is totally inadmissible” (RDP 
Antena 2000). The Timorese ministers noted in a letter that “the East Timorese Cabinet 
members are caricatures of ministers in a government of a banana republic. They have no 
power, no duties, no resources to function adequately (Dodd 2000d). A prominent human 
rights lawyer, Aderito Soares, similarly denounced the fact that the “the U.N. is writing 
regulations for East Timorese without consulting them [East Timor Council and Cabinet]. 
They have little influence” (Dolinski 2000).Though admitting that the initiative of the 
Timorese ministers caught him by “surprise,” Gusmão said he understood their concerns, 
underlining that “the simple appointment of local leaders to the administration does not 
mean the empowering of the Timorese” (Lusa 2000). The UN responded even more 
laconically, UN spokeswoman Barbara Reis stating “the concerns are legitimate and the 
frustrations are legitimate, but we didn’t expect this letter” (Dodd 2000d). 
 
With the August 30, 2001 Constituent Assembly Elections, the Government 
became all East Timorese; it was the beginning of the “second Timorization”. The NC 
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and the Cabinet was supplanted by a Second Transitional Government, consisting of a 
Council of Ministers and an elected Constituent Assembly. The Council of Ministers was 
led by a Chief Minister and was tasked with the supervision of the East Timor Public 
Administration. The members of the Council were all appointed by the SRSG. Moreover, 
all decisions taken by the Council were subject to the review and approval of the 
Transitional Administrator, without which they had no legally binding effect. Sergio 
Vieira de Mello also reminded NC members before the elections that until independence 
he would retain ultimate executive authority under a UN Security Council resolution. For 
instance, he had the power to formally appoint the government, as he appealed the 
political parties to accept a government of national unity. “You won't be getting rid of me 
that easily,” he joked to the NC. However, as noted by Mark Dodd with a tongue-in-
cheek remark, “no-one in the national council laughed”(2001). On April 14, 2002, 
Gusmão, presenting himself as an independent, was elected President of Timor-Leste 
with an overwhelming majority of 82.7 percent. Timor-Leste declared its independence 
one month after, on May 20, 2002.  
 
Conclusion 
One of the lessons learned from the experience of the UN administration of 
Kosovo, according to an internal UNMIK document, is that “the Mission demonstrated a 
lack of cultural sensitivity and an insufficient understanding of the dynamics of the 
society, in terms both of power structures and of negotiations.” Hence, “cultural 
sensitivity and understanding of local society must be the guiding principles for policy 
planning and implementation” for future civil administration mission (UN 2008). 
Certainly, cultural sensitivity, along with robust accountability mechanisms and a greater 
local ownership of the process can help the mission garner a certain degree of legitimacy. 
However, As Simon Chesterman states, “political structures created for foreign control 
(benevolent or not) tend to be unsuited to local rule. The reason for this, in part, is that 
the ‘limited goals’ of foreign control (benevolent or not) are generally determined with 
limited regard to local circumstances” (2004, p. 237). “Participatory intervention” 
(Chopra and Hohe2004), “local ownership” or “indigenous empowerment” (Lederach, 
1995, p. 212) do not fit neatly with direct governance by an international administration, 
at least not following the perspective which led to the establishment of UNMIK and 
UNTAET. Concretely, it means at the very least a substantive normative shift in the 
conduct of state-building. In that regard, first, local actors have to be recognized as true 
partners in the state-building process rather than mere recipients of foreign aid. Hence, 
the empty shell perspective is antithetical to local ownership. Second, if one wants to 
allow space for local actors in a participatory framework, authority can hardly be 
monopolized by the international actors. Concerning the second aspect, as noted by 
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Carsten Stahn, “far-reaching reforms of the political and economic system should not 
necessarily be imposed by international administrations in the immediate post-conflict 
phase. They should rather be managed by newly established domestic institutions or 
mixed national-international organs, acting in concert with international administrations” 
(2005, p. 24). One of the lessons identified in the Timor-Leste and Kosovo experiments is 
that a certain restrain in the exercise of authority on the part of external actors in the 
state-building process can be positive and can contribute to an increase of legitimacy of 
the mission while allowing the local population “to learn from their experience and 
prevent the administrative equivalent of aid dependency” (Salamun 2005, p. 59). Kofi 
Annan also identified this point as a general lesson to be drawn from past experiences, 
stating “ultimately, no rule of law reform, justice reconstruction, or transitional justice 
initiative imposed from the outside can hope to be successful or sustainable. The role of 
the United Nations and the international community should be solidarity, not 
substitution” (UN, 2004, para. 17). Kofi Annan restated this view at the opening session 
of the new Peacebuilding commission: 
 
Peace building requires national ownership, and must be homegrown. Outsiders, 
howeverwell-intentioned, cannot substitute for the knowledge and will of the 
people of the country concerned. It is the latter who best know their own history, 
culture and political contexts. It is they who live with the consequences of the 
decision taken. And it is they who must feel that peacebuilding is their 
achievement, if it is to have any hope of lasting (UN 2006). 
 
This article’s main objective was to shed some light on the rationale behind the 
decision of setting up an international administration, linking policy prescriptions with 
international conception of the war-torn territories of Kosovo and Timor-Leste. Identified 
as the empty shell approach, to paraphrase the practitioners’ own depiction of Kosovo 
and Timor-Leste, this mental image directly impacted the state-building agenda, 
conceived “from the outside-in” (Lemay-Hébert2009b). Furthermore, this article has 
argued that in this international conception liesome of the main hurdles for international 
intervention. The marginalization of local actors, a logical consequence of the empty 
shell approach, has led, on the one hand, international actors to monopolize authority, and 
on the other, these same local actors to express their frustration outside the main political 
channels. Legitimacy quickly withered away while international administrators had to 
face stark choices. This has led Sergio Vieira de Mello to drastically restructure the 
international presence in Timor-Leste in 2000, despite a certain degree of international 
resistance from UN headquarters. At the same time, the collapse of security institutions in 
Timor-Leste in 2006, and the subsequent return in force of the UN, highlights the limits 
of thestate-building project when conducted from the outside and with minimal 
participation from local actors. In Kosovo, the progressive handover of supervision 
competencies to the European Union and to the newly created International Civilian 
Office gave the chance for internationals to reflect on the international experiment so far. 
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Torbjorn Sohlstrom, Head of International Civilian Office Preparation Team, stated in 
2007 that the new international presence “will have a very different relationship with the 
authorities of Kosovo.” He further emphasized that “the international community will no 
longer seek to govern Kosovo. People often suggest that the ICO will be the successor of 
UNMIK. That is not the intention” (Sohlstrom 2007, p. 50). At the same time, Christina 
Gallach, Javier Solana’s spokesperson, stated similarly that “the basic role will not be the 
one of supplanting the local authorities. The local authorities will assume fully their 
responsibilities and they will have to develop every single aspect of authority that is 
going to be given to them” (South East Europe TV Exchange 2007).In that regard, only 
time will tell us if European and ICO officials will be more successful than their 
predecessors in Kosovo. However, one has to bear in mind that if the international 
officials took the path of a more intrusive interpretation of their mandate, along the lines 
of the Bosnian experiment for instance, the solution risks being as fraught with problems 
as it was previously.  
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i	  For	  the	  seasoned	  UN	  official	  Lakhdar	  Brahimi,	  the	  tendency	  to	  push	  for	  the	  “installation	  of	  UN	  governors	  
with	  vast	  powers”	  has	  now	  become	  a	  trend	  (Brahimi	  2005:305).	  	  
ii	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  deep	  divide	  between	  the	  members	  of	  the	  panel	  and	  mirroring	  the	  dissension	  among	  
UN	   member	   states,	   the	   Brahimi	   report	   opens	   the	   door	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   “dedicated	   and	   distinct	  
responsibility	  centre”	   for	   international	  administration	  tasks	  to	  be	  created	  somewhere	  within	  the	  United	  
Nations	  system,	   if	  the	  Secretariat	  anticipates	  “future	  transitional	  administrations	  as	  the	  rule	  rather	  than	  
the	  exception.”	  However,	   the	  Secretary-­‐General	  did	  not	  address	   this	   issue	   in	  his	   response	  to	  the	  report	  
and	   the	   Special	   Committee	   on	   Peacekeeping	   Operations	   clearly	   stated	   that	   “transitional	   civil	  
administrations	   in	   United	   Nations	   peacekeeping	   operations	   have	   been	   undertaken	   on	   an	   exceptional	  
basis,”	  and	  that	  the	  “Secretary-­‐General	  should	  prepare	  a	  more	  detailed	  plan	  of	  action	  only	  if	  the	  General	  
Assembly	  has	  indicated	  its	  interest,”	  which	  it	  did	  not.	  
iii	  The	  armed	  conflict	  between	  the	  Kosovo	  Liberation	  Army	  (KLA)	  and	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Yugoslavia	  
(FRY)	  that	  took	  off	   in	  February	  1998,	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  second	  main	  challenge	  posed	  to	  Western	  Europe	  
and	   the	  United	  States	   in	   less	   than	  a	  decade.	  With	   the	  Rambouillet	  Agreement	  of	  18	  March	  1999	  being	  
rejected	  by	   the	   Serbian	   leadership,	  military	   response	   took	  over	   from	  diplomacy	   in	   the	  Balkans	   and	   the	  
NATO	  Operation	  Allied	  Force	  followed	  on	  22	  March	  1999,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  expelling	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  
of	   Yugoslavia’s	   forces	  out	  of	  Kosovo.	   In	   response,	   the	  Serb	  military	   and	  paramilitaries	   stepped	  up	   their	  
campaign	  against	  Kosovo	  Albanians.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  June	  1999,	  more	  than	  10,000	  casualties	  were	  attributed	  
to	   Serbian	   forces	   in	   Kosovo,	   while	   in	   the	   meantime	   more	   than	   1.5	   million	   of	   Kosovo	   Albanians	   were	  
forcibly	  expelled	   from	  their	  homes,	  which	  represented	  some	  90	  percent	  of	   the	  estimated	  1998	  Kosovar	  
Albanian	  population.	  	  In	  Timor-­‐Leste,	  Indonesia	  agreed	  on	  a	  consultation	  process	  whereby	  the	  population	  
of	  East	  Timor	  would	  vote	  to	  accept	  or	  reject	  the	  idea	  of	  autonomy	  within	  Indonesia.	  Despite	  Indonesia’s	  
overt	  pressure	  on	   the	  Timorese,	   the	   result	  was	  overwhelming	   clear.	   The	  August	  30,	   1999	   vote	   showed	  
that	   78.5	   percent	   of	   East	   Timorese	   voters,	   in	   a	   98	   percent	   turnout,	   rejected	   the	   option	   of	   autonomy	  
within	   Indonesia	   in	   favor	   of	   independence.	   However,	   following	   the	   vote,	   certain	   elements	   of	   the	  
Indonesian	  armed	  forces,	  in	  collaboration	  with	  local	  militias,	  waged	  an	  operation	  called	  Operation	  Clean	  
Sweep,	  a	   three-­‐week	  campaign	  of	  scorched	  earth	  meant	  to	  punish	  the	  East	  Timorese	   for	   their	  decision.	  
The	  operation	  in	  which	  an	  estimated	  1,500	  to	  2,000	  East	  Timorese	  were	  killed	  and	  led	  to	  the	  displacement	  
of	  three-­‐quarter	  of	  the	  total	  population	  of	  890,000,	  including	  the	  exodus	  of	  250,000	  persons.	  
iv	   The	   National	   Council,	   consisting	   of	   33	  members	   and	   later	   36,	   was	   to	   constitute	   a	   sort	   of	   legislative	  
forum,	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  separation	  of	  power	  that	  Timor-­‐Leste	  never	  experienced	  so	  far.	  The	  NC	  had	  
the	   competence	   to	   initiate,	   modify,	   and	   recommend	   draft	   regulations,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   amend	   existing	  
regulations.	  The	  Transitional	  Administrator	  nevertheless	  retained	  final	  decision-­‐making	  authority.	  
v	  According	  to	  the	  UNMIK,	  “preliminary	  results	  of	  an	  UNHCR-­‐led	  survey	  of	  141	  villages	  show	  64	  percent	  of	  
homes	   to	   be	   severely	   damaged	   or	   destroyed.”	   See	   UNMIK	   website:	  
http://www.unmikonline.org/chrono.htm	   [Accessed	   1	   June	   2009]	   Furthermore,	   “UNICEF	   estimates	   that	  
40	  to	  50	  percent	  of	  schools	  have	  been	  damaged”	  (Kifner	  1999).	  
vi	  The	  World	  Bank	  estimated	  that	  about	  70	  percent	  of	  the	  territory’s	  infrastructure	  and	  all	  governmental	  
functions	  were	  destroyed	  in	  1999	  (Strait	  Times	  2000).	  	  
vii	  According	  to	  a	  former	  UNTAET	  official,	  when	  the	  UN	  mission	  started	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  traditional	  system	  
of	   justice,	   it	  was	  mainly	   to	   know	  “how	   to	   codify	   it”	   and	   “who	  were	   the	   representants.”	   Interview	  with	  
UNTAET	  official,	  20	  July	  2008,	  Dili,	  Timor-­‐Leste.	  	  
viii	   The	   Regulation	   stipulates	   that	   the	   UNMIK	   Municipal	   Administrators	   and	   the	   SRSG	   were	   to	   retain	  
extraordinary	  powers	  and	  would	  only	  gradually	  transfer	  administrative	  power	  to	  the	  municipality	  as	  the	  
local	  structure	  proved	  “capacity	  and	  capability	  to	  implement	  effective	  financial	  procedures	  and	  controls.”	  
Furthermore,	  even	  after	  the	  transfer	  of	  administrative	  power,	  the	  SRSG	  shall	  “retain	  in	  full	  the	  authority	  
given	   to	   him	   pursuant	   to	   United	   Nations	   Security	   Council	   resolution	   1244.	   He	   shall	   retain	   the	   final	  
decision-­‐making	  authority	  concerning	  any	  provisions	  of	  the	  present	  Regulation.”	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ix	  Steiner	  identified	  eight	  benchmarks	  that	  would	  have	  to	  be	  met	  by	  the	  PISG	  before	  the	  final	  status	  of	  the	  
territory	   be	   addressed:	   functioning	   democratic	   institutions,	   rule	   of	   law,	   freedom	   of	   movement,	  
sustainable	   returns	  of	   the	  displaced,	  minority	   rights,	   economy,	  property	   rights,	   dialogue	  with	  Belgrade,	  
and	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  Kosovo	  Protection	  Corps.	  These	  standards	  were	  further	  refined	  in	  December	  2003,	  
the	   UN	   specifying	   the	   threshold	   that	   would	   have	   to	   be	   met	   and	   providing	   indicators	   for	   measuring	  
progress.	  	  
x	  The	  events	  are	  generally	  believed	  to	  have	  been	  triggered	  by	   two	  separate	   incidents.	  The	   first	   incident	  
was	  the	  shooting	  of	  a	  Kosovo	  Serb	  youth	  in	  the	  village	  of	  Caglavica	  (Pristina	  region)	  on	  15	  March,	  which	  
led	   to	   a	   blockade	   by	   Kosovo	   Serbs	   of	   the	   main	   Pristina-­‐Skopje	   road	   just	   outside	   Pristina.	   This	   road	   is	  
deemed	  essential	  to	  the	  Kosovar	  economy	  (especially	  for	  the	  Albanian	  community).	  The	  second	  incident,	  
on	   16	   March,	   was	   the	   death	   of	   three	   Albanian	   children	   by	   drowning	   in	   the	   Ibar	   River	   near	   the	   Serb	  
community	  of	  Zubin	  Potok.	  The	  story	  spread	  by	  word	  of	  mouth	  that	   the	  children	  were	  chased	  by	  Serbs	  
before	  their	  death,	  which	  sparked	  Albanian	  attacks	  on	  Serb	  enclaves.	  Though	  the	  circumstances	  of	   that	  
incident	   have	   not	   been	   established	   clearly,	   the	   cumulative	   effects	   of	   the	   two	   incidents	   precipitated	  
spontaneous	   Albanian	   demonstrations.	   The	   demonstrations	   were	   quickly	   taken	   over	   by	   “organized	  
elements”,	  and	  intense	  fighting	  erupted	  between	  the	  two	  communities	  while	  the	  violence	  quickly	  spread	  
to	  other	  cities.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  events,	  19	  persons	  died	  and	  more	  than	  1000	  were	  wounded.	  
